>Til Death Do Us Part: Why Personal Jurisdiction Is
Required to Issue Victim Protection Orders Against
Nonresident Abusers
I. Introduction
Sarah, a young bride, believes her groom, John, is perfect. Soon after
they take their vows, John=s criticism of Sarah transforms into verbal abuse.
His command keeps her trapped in their home. His temper places her in
fear. And eventually, his fist leaves a mark on her face. John apologizes
and reminds Sarah how much he loves her. For better, for worse, Sarah
forgives her husband. This happens again C and again. Sarah has thought
about leaving, but now she is pregnant. After the baby arrives, the stress at
home increases. The blood and bruises are nothing new, but the words out
of John=s mouth are new: “You better believe me when I say that I will kill
you.” But, the baby crying causes him to relax the hands that were
tightening around Sarah=s neck.
The next day, before John gets home from work, Sarah packs a suitcase
with her clothes and things for the baby. With the little one in the car seat,
she heads south on Interstate 35. The drive from Kansas City to Oklahoma
City is five hours. Three years prior to the drive, Sarah left her parents=
house in Oklahoma City; she has only talked to them a few times since the
day she said goodbye. But now there is nowhere else for her to go. Sarah
calls them for help, and her mom promises she will have dinner and a warm
bed waiting for her.
Back in Kansas City, John gets home from work, and the house is empty.
Where is Sarah? She has very few friends because he rarely allows her to
leave the house. It is too late for the baby to have a doctor=s appointment.
John thinks, she will be back. She has threatened to leave several times, but
she always comes back. He calls Sarah=s cell phone repeatedly, but she
does not answer. It gets later, and he realizes she is gone. He suspects she
is with her family in Oklahoma City.
Sarah knows it will not take long for John to figure out where she is.
She is fearful that if John finds her, the abuse will be worse than ever
before. Upon Sarah=s arrival, she and her mother go to the Oklahoma
County courthouse and file a petition for an ex parte emergency victim
protection order. Within hours of the order being issued, and unbeknownst
to Sarah, John is driving through the Kansas prairie, on his way to
Oklahoma . . .
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Hopefully, the above hypothetical is as difficult for the reader as it was
for the author to imagine. Unfortunately, reality closely mirrors this
situation all too often. Domestic violence plagues the entire nation.1
During 2008, more than 500,000 acts of abuse were committed in the
United States against women by their intimate partners,2 “[a]nd more than
2,000 [people] were killed by [their] intimate partners.” 3 Oklahoma is
certainly not immune to domestic violence C 25,189 incidents of domestic
abuse were reported to law enforcement during 2009. 4 Furthermore, more
than 100 people in Oklahoma are killed each year as a result of domestic
violence. Forty-three percent of intimate partner homicide victims were in
the process of leaving their perpetrators.5 Like Sarah, many other
Oklahomans seek protection from abuse by filing for victim protection
orders. 6 During the first eight months of 2008, 2,400 victims of domestic
abuse petitioned for victim protection orders in Oklahoma County District
Court. 7
During the mid-1970s, states began recognizing the lethal nature of
domestic violence and passed legislation that enabled judges to grant victim
protection orders in civil court.8 Currently, all fifty states and the District
of Columbia have domestic violence statutes providing for victim
protection orders. 9 In 1982, the Oklahoma legislature joined this reform
1. See Eric Holder, U.S. Att=y Gen., Speech at Domestic Violence Awareness Month
Event (Oct. 19, 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. INFO. SERVS. DIV. & INFO. TECH. SERVS. DIV., OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, STATE OF OKLAHOMA UNIFORM CRIME REPORT ANNUAL REPORT 8-2 (2009),
available at http://www.ok.gov/osbi/documents/2009%20UCR%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
Domestic Abuse includes such offenses as murder, sex crimes, assault, and assault and
battery. Id. Domestic abuse reports have increased by 14.2% between 2000 and 2009. Id.
5. OKLA. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW BD., OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOMICIDE IN OKLAHOMA ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009)
[hereinafter FATALITY REVIEW BOARD], available at http://www.oag.ok.gov/oagweb.nsf/0/
53d 98acaf26a9585862577b5004ed38b/$FILE/2009%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
6. See Bryan Painter, Oklahoma County Filings Show Increase for Protective Orders,
THE OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 28, 2008, http://newsok.com/oklahoma-county-filings-showincrease-for-protective-orders/article/3303774.
7. Id. This was the largest number of victim protection orders applied for in Oklahoma
County since 2003. Id. Two-thousand four hundred filings for victim protection orders “is
123 more than in the same time period [in 2007] and 173 more than [in 2006].” Id.
8. Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL=Y REV. 51, 53 (2000).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, ' 1045 (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. ' 236.2 (West
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.725 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, ' 1
(West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. ' 2C:25-18 (West 2005).
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and passed the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act. 10 Sections 60-60.18
of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes provide protection for victims of
domestic abuse in Oklahoma. 11 Despite both proactive and remedial efforts
to curb domestic violence, Oklahoma is still ranked fifteenth nationally for
having the highest number of women murdered by men each year.12
These high numbers are not mitigated by vagaries in the existing laws.
The question remains unanswered whether the protection granted by a
victim protection order extends to women, like Sarah, who come to
Oklahoma seeking shelter from domestic abuse. When victims of domestic
violence flee the homes they share with their abusers, they often seek
refuge with friends, family, or in shelters, and many move to another city or
state to hide from their abusers. 13 This can raise a number of difficult
questions for the courts. What if none of the acts of violence occurred in
Oklahoma? What if her abuser has not yet set foot on Oklahoma soil?
Must Oklahoma have personal jurisdiction over the abuser to issue a victim
protection order against him? Or, is a victim protection order instead a
declaration of the victim=s protected status, which does not demand
personal jurisdiction over the defendant? The state=s interest in protecting
victims located within its borders should not jeopardize the abusers=
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, but the mere possibility that
those rights are conceivably in play should not leave victims of abuse
completely unprotected. A major hurdle stands between victims that come
to Oklahoma seeking shelter and the protection from abuse afforded by the
state of Oklahoma under Title 22, Sections 60-60.18 of the Oklahoma
Statutes. The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act does not specify
whether the state must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant-abuser
to issue a victim protection order against him. 14 Furthermore, if personal

10. See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.6 (Supp. 1982) (current version at 22 OKLA. STAT. ''
60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
11. 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18.
12. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2008
HOMICIDE DATA 15 (2010), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2010.pdf. Other
reports claim Oklahoma ranks ninth. Editorial, Deadly Results: Domestic Violence Death
Rates Too High, THE OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 4, 2009, at 16A. Oklahoma was ranked fourth for
number of women killed by men in 2008. Amy Lester, Oklahoma Ranks Fourth in
Domestic Violence, (KWTV News 9, Oklahoma City television broadcast Oct. 2, 2008)
available at http://www.newson6.com/Global/category.asp?C=121535&clipId=2974674
&autostart=true.
13. Lee Ann Jones, Note, Domestic Relations: Oklahoma=s Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 349, 359 (1983).
14. 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18.
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jurisdiction is required, the Act does not indicate how the state might
achieve personal jurisdiction over a nonresident abuser. 15
Part II of this comment describes Oklahoma=s response to the prevalence
of domestic violence in the state, and the process for obtaining a victim
protection order under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, as well as
the federal government=s response to this danger. Part II will also describe
the traditional requirements for satisfying procedural due process and
briefly discuss the constitutionality of ex parte emergency protective orders.
Part III will examine the three rationales embodied in cases where other
states have answered the jurisdictional question presented in the scenario
above. Part IV will evaluate these three rationales under the microscope of
Oklahoma law and suggest how Oklahoma ought to balance the state=s
interests in both protecting victims of domestic abuse and ensuring a
nonresident defendant=s right to due process is upheld. This comment
concludes in Part V.
II. Victim Protection Orders and Due Process Requirements
A. The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act
Before the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act was passed in 1982, a
victim of domestic abuse could only get a court order to stop abuse if the
victim was married to her abuser and had filed for divorce or separate
maintenance. 16 As a result, prior to the passage of the Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act, many victims of domestic abuse were precluded from
civil protective relief.17 The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act
expanded the class of victims that could petition for protective relief by
defining “domestic abuse” as “any act of physical harm, or the threat of
imminent physical harm” when the abuser and the victim “are family or
household members or who are or were in a dating relationship.” 18 The
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act defines “family or household
members” as:
[S]pouses, ex-spouses, present spouses of ex-spouses, parents,
including grandparents, stepparents, adoptive parents, and foster
15. See id.
16. Jones, supra note 13, at 350; see 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1276 (1981) (allowing for
obtaining protective orders during dissolution proceedings) (current version at 43 OKLA.
STAT. ' 110.B.2 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (providing for ex parte temporary restraining order
after filing petition for dissolution of marriage)).
17. See Jones, supra note 13, at 350.
18. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.1.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
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parents, children, including grandchildren, stepchildren, adopted
children, and foster children, persons otherwise related by blood
or marriage, persons living in the same household or who
formerly lived in the same household, and persons who are the
biological parents of the same child, regardless of their marital
status, or whether they have lived together at any time. 19
Under the statute, a “‘[d]ating relationship,’ means a courtship or
engagement relationship.” 20
A basic understanding of how a victim protection order is obtained, its
effect, and how it is enforced, is necessary to understand the due process
implications of this court order. A victim of domestic abuse may seek relief
under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act by filing a petition for an ex
parte emergency protective order in Oklahoma district court.21 Victims of
domestic violence often file their petitions for protective orders pro se. 22
The Oklahoma legislature requires that the Administrative Office of the
Courts develop a standard form for the petition and for both ex parte and
final protective orders.23 The court clerk provides the form petition to the
victim-plaintiff at the courthouse. 24 Furthermore, the Oklahoma State
Courts Network provides downloadable and printable versions of these
forms on its website. 25 The statute specifically provides that upon the
plaintiff=s request, “the court clerk or the victim-witness coordinator, victim
support person, and court case manager shall prepare or assist the plaintiff
in preparing the petition.” 26

19. Id. ' 60.1.4.
20. Id. ' 60.1.5 (specifying that a dating relationship does not include “a casual
acquaintance or ordinary fraternization between persons in a business or social context”).
Domestic violence reaches far beyond the confines of marriage; the Oklahoma Domestic
Violence Fatality Review Board reported that fifty-two percent of domestic partner violence
homicides were current or former “intimate partner” homicides. FATALITY REVIEW BOARD,
supra note 5, at 1.
21. 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.2-60.3.
22. See LISAE JORDAN & BETTE GARLOW, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL LAW MANUAL:
PROTECTION ORDERS AND FAMILY LAW CASES ch. 3, at 3 (Rebecca Henry ed., 3d ed. 2007).
23. 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.2.B, 60.3.A, 60.4.D. These forms are available online at
http://www.oscn.net/static/forms/aoc_forms/protectiveorders.asp. The two most relevant to
this article are the Petition for Protective Order and the Petition for Emergency Temporary
Protective Order, cited infra, which are linked on this site.
24. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.B.
25. THE OKLAHOMA STATE COURTS NETWORK, http://www.oscn.net/static/forms/district
forms.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
26. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.D.
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The district court judge reviews the plaintiff=s petition, and “if the court
finds sufficient grounds within the scope of the Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act” it holds “an ex parte hearing on the same day the petition is
filed[,]” before the defendant-abuser receives notice or has an opportunity
to be heard. 27 Generally, district court judges grant hearings on the victim=s
petition for a protective order.28 If, at the hearing, the victim shows good
cause for the protection order, and the court finds an emergency protection
order is “necessary to protect the victim from immediate and present danger
of domestic abuse,” the emergency ex parte protection order is granted and
remains in effect until there is a full hearing with the defendant present.29
A copy of the victim=s petition, “notice of hearing, and a copy of [the]
emergency ex parte order issued by the court [are then] served upon the
defendant;” the victim protection order is effective as soon as the defendant
is served. 30 Regardless of whether the court grants or denies the emergency
ex parte order, a full hearing will be held within twenty days of filing for
the protection order. 31 If, by the date of the full hearing the defendant has
not yet been served, the plaintiff-victim can then request to renew the
petition or the emergency protective order with a new hearing date. 32
After either the emergency ex parte hearing or the full hearing, “the court
may impose any terms and conditions in the protective order that the court
reasonably believes are necessary to bring about the cessation of domestic
abuse against the victim.” 33 Commonly, the court order will prohibit the
defendant from contacting, abusing, injuring, threatening, harassing, and/or
stalking the petitioner.34 A protection order may also require the defendantabuser to vacate the home he shares with the victim or order the defendantabuser to stay a certain distance away from the victim=s residence. 35 Most
noteworthy is the court=s wide discretion for ordering relief beyond what is

27. Id. ' 60.3.A.
28. See Painter, supra note 6. Oklahoma County Special Judge Barry Hafar said, “When
there=s domestic violence and you see that in the application, there=s a no tolerance policy.”
Id. Judge Hafar has granted a hearing to nearly ninety percent of victims that have filed a
petition for protection. Id.
29. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.3.A; see JORDAN & GARLOW, supra note 22, ch. 3, at 3 (“Ex
parte orders are not enforceable until served on the respondent.”).
30. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.4.A.
31. Id. ' 60.4.B.1.
32. Id. '' 60.4.B.3.-60.4.B.4.
33. Id. ' 60.4.C.1.
34. See Petition for Protective Order at 4-6 and Petition for Emergency Temporary
Protective Order at 4-6, supra note 23.
35. Id.
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indicated on the pre-printed form. 36 The final protective order typically
stays in effect for three years. 37
The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act is found in Title 22 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, which pertains to criminal procedure. 38 On its face,
this can cause some confusion. Protection orders issued under the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are civil protection orders.39 The
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found victim protection orders were
“civil, not criminal, in nature” because, in criminal actions, the state
prosecutes “a person charged with a public offense.” 40 Clearly, a petition
for a victim protection order is filed by the victim, not the state; therefore, it
is a civil action. The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act creates a private
cause of action resting with the victim. 41 Because an action for a victim
protection order is not criminal, the rules of civil procedure apply, and the
victim protection order is a legally binding court order. 42 Unlike the penal
role of criminal courts, a victim protection order issued by a civil court “is
meant to prevent future abusive behavior rather than punish past
behavior.” 43
There are, however, criminal penalties for violating an ex parte or final
protection order. 44 The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act is most likely
included in the state=s criminal procedure title because of the criminal
sanctions imposed for violations of victim protection orders. 45 A first
conviction for violating a victim protection order is a misdemeanor and is
punishable by a fine and/or up to one year imprisonment. 46 A second
violation of a victim protection order is a felony offense and is punishable
by a higher fine and/or one to three years imprisonment. 47 For both the first

36. See Petition for Protective Order at 6, supra note 23, and Petition for Emergency
Temporary Protective Order at 5, supra note 23.
37. See 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.4.G (stating this to be the case unless extended, modified,
vacated, or rescinded). Often final protective orders are referred to as “permanent”
protective orders. This term is misleading, because protective orders are rarely permanent.
See JORDAN & GARLOW, supra note 22, ch. 3, at 5.
38. See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18.
39. Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25, & 10, 686 P.2d 990, 993.
40. Id. (quoting 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 7 (Supp. 1983)).
41. See Tobkin v. State, 777 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
42. See Waul, supra note 8, at 54.
43. Id.
44. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.6 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
45. See id.
46. Id. ' 60.6.A.1.
47. Id. ' 60.6.A.2.
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and second violation, if the violation actually injures the plaintiff, the
sanctions are more severe. 48
It is also important to recognize that protective orders issued under the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act listed above are distinct from an ex
parte temporary restraining order issued under Title 43, Section 110 of the
Oklahoma Statutes. 49 Under Title 43, the petition for a restraining order
must accompany a petition for the dissolution of marriage; therefore, it is
limited to a spousal relationship.50
The state of Oklahoma recognizes the statewide and national validity of
protection orders issued in accordance with the Protection From Domestic
Abuse Act in Oklahoma. 51 Furthermore, Oklahoma presumes the validity
of protection orders issued by other state=s courts “even if the foreign
protection order contains provisions which could not be contained in a
protective order issued by an Oklahoma court.” 52 In accordance with the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) enacted by the United States
Congress in 1994, 53 Oklahoma gives full faith and credit to all valid victim
protection orders issued by other jurisdictions. 54 Not only does the VAWA
promote full faith and credit among the states, the VAWA also makes it a
federal crime to cross state lines to violate a victim protection order.55
Furthermore, federal law prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm
or ammunition if he is subject to a victim protection order that prohibits
him from harassing, stalking, threatening, or using force reasonably

48. Compare id. ' 60.6.A.1 (penalty for first violation of victim protection order that
does not result in injury to plaintiff), and id. ' 60.6.A.2 (penalty for second violation of
victim protection order that does not result in injury to the plaintiff), with id. ' 60.6.B.1
(penalty for first violation of victim protection order that results in injury to the plaintiff),
and id. ' 60.6.B.2 (penalty for second violation of victim protection order that results in
injury to plaintiff).
49. 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 110.B.2 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
50. Id.; but see 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.A.1-60.2.B.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (“If the
dissolution of marriage action and the petition for a protection order are filed separately, the
two actions may be consolidated.”).
51. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.7 (2001).
52. Id. ' 60.12.A (2001).
53. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
54. Id.; “[f]oreign protective order means any valid order of protection issued by a court
of another state or a tribal court.” Id. ' 60.1.6 (internal quotations omitted); see also 18
U.S.C. ' 2265(a) (2006) (not self-executing).
55. See id. ' 2262. It is also a federal crime to travel across state lines for the purpose of
committing domestic violence, see id. ' 2261(a)(1), or to cause an intimate or dating partner
to cross state lines for the purpose of committing domestic violence, see id. ' 2261(a)(2).
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expected to cause injury to another.56 In Oklahoma, fifty-seven percent of
domestic homicide victims are killed with a firearm. 57
B. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process
In Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 58 the United States Supreme
Court declared that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the state courts to
enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident defendants.” 59
Generally, to satisfy procedural due process, the defendant must be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 60 Furthermore, the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, 61 as well as personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. 62 Personal jurisdiction gives the court the power to render a
“binding judgment against the defendant.” 63
The purpose of Oklahoma=s “long-arm statute is to extend the
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts to the outer limits permitted by the
Oklahoma Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.” 64 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that personal jurisdiction is not avoided merely because a
nonresident defendant did not physically enter the state.65 Jurisdiction
under the long-arm statute may be predicated on activities in another state
that result as harm in the forum state. 66 The outer limits of due process
require that in order to subject a nonresident defendant to a court=s
judgment against him, the nonresident defendant must have certain
“minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 67
56. See id. ' 922(g)(8).
57. See FATALITY REVIEW BOARD, supra note 5, at 4.
58. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
59. Id. at 91.
60. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also
Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petrol. Corp., 1986 OK 16, & 12, 732 P.2d 438, 443, n. 25.
61. See 27A AM. JUR. 2D. Equity ' 62 (2008).
62. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1878); Int=l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity ' 62
(2008).
63. Conoco Inc. v. Agrico Chem. Co., 2004 OK 83, & 16, 115 P.3d 829, 834.
64. Id. & 17, 115 P.3d at 834; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2004.F (2001 & Supp. 2007)
(allowing Oklahoma court to “exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the
Constitution of the state and the Constitution of the United States.”).
65. Hough v. Leonard, 1993 OK 112, & 7, 867 P.2d 438, 442.
66. See id. (citing Fields v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 1976 OK 106, & 6, 555 P.2d 48,
52).
67. Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of Okla., 2006 OK 58, & 16, 152 P.3d 165, 173 (internal
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The nonresident defendant=s “conduct and connection with the forum State
[must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.” 68 The nonresident defendant “must have meaningful ‘contacts, ties
or relations’ to the forum state.” 69
The Oklahoma judiciary follows a two-step process for ascertaining
whether the court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.70
First, the court asks if the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts
with Oklahoma such “that he should have reasonably anticipated being
haled into court there.” 71 Second, if minimum contacts are established, the
court examines whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with
“fair play and substantial justice.” 72 When determining the reasonableness
of a nonresident defending his suit in the forum, Oklahoma courts consider
the following factors: “the burden on the defendant,” “the [state=s] interest
in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff=s interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief,” the interest of the interstate judicial system in
obtaining an efficient resolution, and the shared interest of the states in
However, a
“furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” 73
nonresident defendant may waive his objection to the court=s improper
exercise of personal jurisdiction. 74 If the nonresident defendant makes a
general appearance without specifically objecting to the court=s assertion of
personal jurisdiction, he consents to the court=s jurisdiction by waiver. 75
Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is not required when
the court is adjudicating the status of one of its domiciliaries. 76 Every state
has the power to determine or alter the status relationship between those

quotation marks omitted); see Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 1965 OK 212, && 25-33,
418 P.2d 900, 907-909 (providing an analysis of the rational of long-arm jurisdiction as
expressed in Int=l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
68. Gilbert, & 16, 152 P.3d at 173 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
69. Klassen v. Lazik, 2004 OK CIV APP 46, & 8, 91 P.3d 90, 92 (citing Int=l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 319).
70. See id. && 10-11, 91 P.3d at 92-93.
71. See id. & 10, 91 P.3d at 92-93 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
72. Id. & 11, 91 P.3d at 93 (citing Int=l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320)(internal citations omitted).
73. Lively v. IJAM, Inc., 2005 OK CIV APP 29, & 27, 114 P.3d 487, 494-95 (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
74. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2012.A (2001 & Supp. 2007) (making general appearance
waives lack of personal jurisdiction defense); Russell v. McGinn, 1973 OK 43, & 14, 514
P.2d 658, 660 (citing Turner v. Big Four Petrol. Co., 1954 OK 244, & 13, 274 P.2d 524, 52627).
75. See Russell v. McGinn, 1973 OK 43, & 14, 514 P.2d 658, 660.
76. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
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found within its borders and nonresidents when the state has a strong
interest in the status relationship, like marriage, at issue. 77
While an emergency ex parte protective order is issued before the
defendant has notice or the opportunity to be heard, ex parte victim
protection orders have consistently survived constitutional challenges.78 In
Marquette v. Marquette, 79 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that
protection orders issued ex parte do not violate the defendant=s right to due
process. 80 The court noted that domestic violence had become “a problem
of considerable magnitude.” 81 In Marquette, the defendant argued that an
ex parte order for protection, entered under the Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act, was a violation of procedural due process. 82 The defendant
alleged that the state interfered with his liberty by prohibiting him from
communicating with his wife, the custodial parent, thus denying him the
right to visit his child.83 Under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act,
the defendant is not afforded an opportunity to appear until after the
emergency protective order is issued. 84 The court weighed the defendant=s
right to due process with the state=s interest in protecting victims of
domestic abuse and the risk of erroneous deprivation. 85 The court held that
the “State=s interest in securing immediate protection for abused victims” 86
and the procedural safeguards contained in the Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act survived the demands of due process. 87 The court applied the
Mathews v. Eldridge 88 test in balancing the infringement on the defendant=s
rights before notice and opportunity to be heard against the government=s
interest in issuing the protective order and the risk of erroneous deprivation
under existing procedures. 89 The court determined the state had an interest
77. See id.
78. See e.g., David H. Taylor et al., Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection:
How Easing Access to Judicial Process has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of the Process,
18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL=Y 83, 93-100.
79. 1984 OK CIV APP 25, 686 P.2d 990.
80. Id. & 20, 686 P.2d at 996.
81. Id. & 18, 686 P.2d at 996.
82. Id. & 16, 686 P.2d at 995.
83. Id.
84. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.3.A (2001 & Supp. 2007)
85. See id. & 18, 686 P.2d at 995-96.
86. Id. & 19, 686 P.2d at 996.
87. Id.
88. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
89. Marquette && 17-20, 686 P.2d at 995-96 (footnotes omitted). An ex parte order is
only issued after the plaintiff shows good cause at the hearing and the court finds the order
“is necessary to protect the victim from immediate and present danger of domestic abuse”
and a hearing is held 10 days after the ex parte order is issued. See id. While there is some
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in “securing immediate protection for abused victims” 90 because of the
magnitude of the problem and the serious risk of death if abuse continued. 91
The court held that, when balanced against the state=s interest in protecting
victims of domestic abuse, the procedural safeguards embedded in the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act prior to the issuance of an ex parte
order sufficiently protected the defendant=s due process rights. 92
Like notice and opportunity to be heard, personal jurisdiction is a due
process issue. However, the question of what constitutional guarantees can
be sacrificed with respect to personal jurisdiction cannot be answered by
the inquiry made in Marquette. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court
agreed that the state=s interest in protecting victims of domestic violence is
lofty, 93 the court has not ruled on the due process issue pertaining to
personal jurisdiction.
Oklahoma has yet to examine whether a
nonresident=s due process rights remain secure when personal jurisdiction is
not required before issuing a victim protection order against him.
III. The Jurisdictional Requirements of Other Courts
A. Status Jurisdiction
Nathan and Tara Bartsch were in a situation much like John and Sarah in
the opening hypothetical. 94 While Nathan and Tara were together, they
lived in Utah. 95 Tara and their infant daughter left Utah and went to Iowa
to live with Tara=s parents. 96 Nathan lived in Utah and Colorado and was
not a resident of Iowa when Tara filed an application for a temporary
protective order in Iowa district court under Iowa=s Domestic Abuse Act. 97
Nathan moved to dismiss the order granted by the district court for want
of personal jurisdiction.98 The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district
court=s legal conclusion that “personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant is not required for a court to enter an order preserving the
protected status afforded Iowa residents under [the Domestic Abuse
risk of erroneous deprivation, the judge has the opportunity to examine the credibility of the
plaintiff before granting the order. Id.
90. Id. & 20, 686 P.2d at 996.
91. See id. && 18-19, 686 P.2d at 996.
92. See id. && 19-20, 686 P.2d at 996.
93. See Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 10, 213 P.3d 550, 555.
94. See Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa 2001).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also IOWA CODE ANN. ' 236.1 (West 2008).
98. See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 5.
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Act].” 99 The court analogized victim protection orders with divorce
decrees, child custody determinations, and actions to terminate parental
rights, all of which do not require personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
but rather allow jurisdiction because the state has the authority “to
determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants.”100 Just as the
state can determine the status of someone within its borders as being either
married or single, 101 the court held that the Domestic Abuse Act “clearly
creates a status of ‘protection;’” therefore, the state can determine the status
of the plaintiff, even though the defendant-abuser is not personally subject
to the state=s jurisdiction. 102
The Supreme Court of Iowa believed that if status jurisdiction applied to
divorce actions, then it certainly applied to victim protection orders, finding
that “[t]he greater and more immediate risk of harm from domestic
violence” made “application of the status exception to protective orders
even more compelling than in [divorce] actions.”103 The court went on to
declare:
[T]he State=s interest in protecting victims of domestic abuse is
equal to, if not greater than, its interest in actions determining
child custody or terminating parental rights because it involves
the safety of the protected parties. If the State can make
adjudications without personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
parent in custody determinations in which it has a strong state
interest, it also has that right in domestic-abuse protection
actions in which it has an even stronger interest. 104
To determine if the state has proper jurisdiction for a child custody
proceeding, Iowa follows the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, 105 which does not require personal jurisdiction over the
defendant-parent. 106 Child custody proceedings include legal custody, the
termination of parental rights, and, specifically, orders protecting a child
from domestic violence.107 The court further stated that the state=s
“domestic-abuse statute evidences a special solicitude for potential abuse
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6, 9 (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877)).
See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
Id. at 7; see also Williams, 317 U.S. at 298-299 (1942).
Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 9.
Id.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY & ENFORCEMENT ACT ' 201, 9 U.L.A. 672 (1997).
See IOWA CODE ANN. ' 598B.201 (West 2008).
Id. ' 598B.102(4).
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victims.” 108 To support this claim, the court cited the provisions of the
Domestic Abuse Act that allow the petition to be filed without cost to the
plaintiff-victim, that make forms available to pro se plaintiffs, and that
allow the county attorney to assist the plaintiff. 109
The court in Bartsch relied on an opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to support its holding. 110 In In re Adoption of J.L.H., 111 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court used the status jurisdiction rationale to decide the
issue of proper jurisdiction for nonconsensual stepparent adoption. 112
Where the biological mother was a resident of Kansas, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court determined personal jurisdiction was not needed because,
[t]he so-called minimum contacts doctrine . . . was fashioned to
gauge the standards of due process for the exercise of
jurisdiction to render an in personam judgment against one not
served within the state C a form of forensic cognizance that is
not implicated in this case because here no personal judgment is
sought against the Kansas mother. 113
Applying the Oklahoma Supreme Court=s rationale, the Supreme Court
of Iowa found the protective order “does not purport to grant affirmative
relief against the defendant; it merely preserves the protected status
accorded to the plaintiff by [the Domestic Abuse Act].” 114 A protective
order “does not attempt to impose a personal judgment against the
defendant.” 115 Under analogous facts, Bartsch was controlling in Doe v.
Iowa District Court for Scott County in 2007. 116
The dissent in Bartsch maintained that a protective order under Iowa=s
Domestic Abuse Act was not a status determination. 117 Justice Carter
vehemently emphasized that Tara Bartsch sought injunctive relief against
her husband, not a declaration of her status.118 Furthermore, the dissent
stated that an injunction was affirmative relief.119 In his dissent, Justice
108. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 9.
109. Id. (citing IOWA CODE ' 236.3(7), .3A(2), .3(B)(1999)).
110. See id. at 8.
111. 1987 OK 25, 737 P.2d 915.
112. Id. & 9, 737 P.2d at 918-19.
113. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 8 (quoting J.L.H., & 9, 737 P.2d at 919).
114. Id. at 6.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Doe v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Scott Cnty., No. 06-0696, 2007 WL 913851 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 28, 2007).
117. See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 11 (Carter, J., dissenting).
118. See id.
119. See id.
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Carter noted that the United States Supreme Court=s broad interpretation of
due process “operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to
enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident defendants” and
a nonresident defendant=s rights and interests go beyond money judgments
against him. 120 The dissent asserted that Nathan Bartsch=s liberty interests
were substantially affected as a result of the victim protection order being
issued against him, which included restricting his right to possess a firearm,
and “there [were] collateral consequences of a lasting nature.”121
B. Personal Jurisdiction
The facts leading up to the Family Court of Delaware=s decision in T.L.
v. W.L. 122 also resemble those in both the opening hypothetical and the
Bartsch case. In T.L., the husband, wife, and two children lived in Ohio. 123
After allegedly suffering abuse from her husband, the wife and two children
left Ohio and moved in with the wife=s mother in Delaware. 124 Two days
after arriving in Delaware, the wife filed for a victim protection order.125
Following the precedent that the “[c]ourt must weigh an individual=s
rights of due process against Delaware=s strong interest in preventing abuse,
and the necessity for taking prompt action,” the court determined that the
“husband=s rights of due process vastly outweigh[ed] the state=s legitimate
concerns to protect its resident . . . from domestic violence.”126 The court
held that under Delaware law, victim protection orders could not be issued
against nonresident defendants without the state first having personal
jurisdiction over them. 127 The court based its decision on a reading of the
Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders
Act, 128 which required participating states to enforce victim protection
orders issued by other states so long as the issuing court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant-abuser. 129 The court also looked to
principles of federal constitutional law which provided that a judgment
issued by a court in one state must be given full faith and credit by all other
120. Id. (quoting Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)).
121. Id. at 11-12 (citing 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8) (2006) (prohibiting a person subject to a
victim protection order from possessing a firearm)).
122. 820 A.2d 506 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003).
123. Id. at 507.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 513-14.
127. See id. at 516.
128. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, ' 1049 (West 2009)(adopting the Uniform Interstate
Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act into Delaware statutory law).
129. See id. at 513.
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states, so long as due process was not violated when the order was
issued. 130
The Family Court of Delaware began waffling in its decision to require
personal jurisdiction, however, when it suggested that if the plaintiff-victim
had been a “bona fide resident” of the state, the traditional personal
jurisdiction requirements might be relaxed, so as not to “hinder the state in
determining the status of [its bona fide resident].”131 The T.L. court did not
reject Bartsch on the basis that issuances of protection orders are not status
adjudications. Rather, the Delaware court gave two reasons for requiring
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant-abuser: (1) while
Delaware had lowered minimum contact requirements in status
determinations, the wife had only been in Delaware for two days, so she
was not a bona fide resident of Delaware and the due process requirements
should not be relaxed; and (2) the wife=s application for a protective order
did not suggest the husband had minimum contacts with Delaware because
all acts of abuse occurred in Ohio.132 The court recommended that the wife
seek protective relief in Ohio.133 In dicta, the court suggested that had the
wife=s application for a victim protection order “alleged that husband had
pursued the family into Delaware while making additional threats and
placing wife and children in fear of harm” the court=s decision may have
been different, because the nonresident defendant would have established
minimum contacts with the state.134
The court distinguishes T.L. from Bartsch by suggesting that in Bartsch,
because neither party resided in the state where the acts of abuse allegedly
occurred, “the Iowa court found it reasonable for Iowa to proceed with the
case.” 135 Furthermore, Tara Bartsch filed her application for the victim
protection order one month after arriving in Iowa. 136 While the Delaware
court may be suggesting that the Bartsch court decided a victim protection
order is a status determination because the victim was a bona fide resident

130. See id. at 514.
131. Id. at 512-13 (quoting Cohen v. Cohen, 84 A. 122, 124 (Del. Super. Ct. 1912)
(pertaining to the dissolution of marriage)).
132. Id. at 514.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 514-515. Most of the facts contained in the allegations occurred in Utah.
Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Iowa 2001). The wife lived in Iowa at the time she
applied for the victim protection order, and the husband was living in either Utah or
Colorado. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court of Iowa stated, “[w]ith respect to residence,
Nathan=s status is unclear.” Id. at 10.
136. See T.L., 820 A.2d at 514.

2011]

COMMENTS

837

of Iowa, the Supreme Court of Iowa never addressed residency
requirements for making determinations regarding the status of the state=s
residents. The Family Court of Delaware clearly acknowledged that while
the state has “an important interest in fostering the protection against
domestic abuse, its power to do so should be tempered to be sure that it is
serving bona fide residents and not extending protective [o]rders against
persons lacking requisite minimum contacts with the state.” 137
C. Different Jurisdictional Requirements Apply Based on Whether
Prohibitive or Affirmative Relief is Ordered
Similar facts arise again in Shah v. Shah: 138 a husband and wife lived in
Illinois, where she was allegedly abused. 139 She fled to New Jersey to stay
with family friends. 140 Once in New Jersey, the wife applied for a
temporary restraining order under the state=s Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act. 141 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that “if personal
jurisdiction cannot be exercised over a [nonresident] defendant within
constitutional due process limits, the temporary restraining order may only
provide for prohibitory relief.” 142 The court further held that the issuance
of a final restraining order required minimum contacts, because, by
statutory definition, a final order includes an order of affirmative relief, e.g.
the surrender of firearms. 143
In determining whether personal jurisdiction was required before the
court could issue a victim protection order, the New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed with the lower court=s distinction between prohibitive and
affirmative relief and reasoned:
[A prohibitory order] allows the entry of an order prohibiting
acts of domestic violence against a defendant over whom no
personal jurisdiction exists, [and] is addressed not to the
defendant but to the victim: it provides the victim the very
protection the law specifically allows, and it prohibits the
defendant from engaging in behavior already specifically

137. Id. at 516.
138. 875 A.2d 931 (N.J. 2005).
139. Id. at 933.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 942.
143. Id. at 940. One against whom a victim protection order has been issued is required
to surrender firearms and pay a civil penalty and a surcharge. See N.J. STAT. ANN. ' 2C:2529b (West 1991).
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outlawed. Because the issuance of a prohibitory order does not
implicate any of [the] defendant=s substantive rights, the trial
court [has] jurisdiction to enter a temporary restraining order . . .
. 144
While the Shah court was “unpersuaded by the ‘status exception’” 145 in
Bartsch, it still upheld the issuance of a victim protection order despite the
defendant not having the requisite minimum contacts with the state. 146 The
court maintained the propriety of personal jurisdiction “when a court
attempts to exercise its coercive power to compel action by a defendant.”147
Presented with analogous facts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals followed
the Shah court, holding that prohibitory orders do not require personal
jurisdiction to satisfy due process. 148 In Spencer v. Spencer, the Kentucky
court found that the distinction between prohibitory and affirmative relief
was “the fairest balance between protecting the due process rights of the
nonresident defendant and the state=s clearly-articulated interest in
protecting the plaintiff and her child against domestic violence.”149 In
Spencer, the order was vacated and remanded back to the county circuit
courts with instructions to limit the protective order to prohibit the
nonresident abuser “from breaking the law in Kentucky by approaching [his
wife and daughter].” 150 Specifically, aspects of the victim protection order
issued by the county circuit court that were to be excluded were those
forbidding the possession of a firearm and requiring attendance of domestic
violence counseling, because these were said to be affirmative obligations
placed on the defendant, over whom the court did not have personal
jurisdiction. 151
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Caplan v. Donovan, 152
was also presented with a situation involving a nonresident defendantabuser and the plaintiff-victim seeking shelter in the state. 153 The Caplan
Court agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court that a victim protection order
144. Shah, 875 A.2d at 939.
145. Id. at 940 n.5.
146. See id. at 939-940.
147. Id. at 939.
148. Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
149. Id. See id., n.8 (citing Barnett v. Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Ky. 2003) (“[T]he
domestic violence statute should be construed liberally in favor of protecting victims from
domestic violence and preventing future acts of violence.”)).
150. Id. at 19.
151. See id.
152. 879 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. 2008).
153. See id. at 119-20.
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required status jurisdiction generally, and personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant was not required. 154 The Massachusetts court
explained that its holding “furthers the Commonwealth=s important public
policy goal of securing ‘the fundamental human right to be protected from
the devastating impact of family violence’ . . . by declaring the protected
status of a person who is currently domiciled in this Commonwealth after
coming here to escape from abuse.”155 By requiring personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, the Commonwealth would leave the victim
with two unpalatable alternatives for getting protection: the victim could
“return to the State in which the abuse occurred,” or “wait for the abuser to
follow the victim to the Commonwealth and, in the event of a new incident
of abuse, seek an order from a Massachusetts court.” 156
While the Iowa Supreme Court alluded to the due process limitations
applied to status determinations, the court in Caplan specifically set out that
status determinations must be “limited to prohibitions that relate to the
protected status of a person within the Commonwealth.” 157 The court stated
that due process limitations to status determinations included: (1) that the
victim protection order “must provide the defendant with reasonable notice
and an opportunity to be heard”; 158 and (2) that “a valid judgment imposing
a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only
by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” 159
Therefore, the Massachusetts court held that “a court may issue . . . an order
of prevention and protection even without personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, but may not impose affirmative obligations on the defendant if
there is no personal jurisdiction.” 160
Most recently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire followed the
Massachusetts Supreme Court=s reasoning in Caplan. 161 In Hemenway v.
Hemenway, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the wife
failed to “demonstrate facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.” 162 Because the New Hampshire court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court limited the victim
154. Id. at 123.
155. Id. at 123 (quoting Champagne v. Champagne, 708 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1999);
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)).
156. Id. at 123.
157. Id. at 124.
158. Id. at 123.
159. Id. at 123 (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)).
160. Id. at 119.
161. See Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575 (N.H. 2010).
162. Id. at 580 (quoting Chick v. C & F Enter., 938 A.2d 112 (N.H. 2007).
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protection order “to the extent that it protects the wife from abuse,” and
“reverse[d] to the extent that the order require[d] affirmative action from
the defendant.” 163 The court specifically pointed to the conflict that arose
between the state=s “strong interest in providing protection to victims of
domestic violence within [the] State” and requiring personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. 164 Like the courts in Shah, Spencer, and Caplan, the
Hemenway court found the state=s policy interest in the victim=s protected
status outweighed the need for personal jurisdiction if the victim protection
order contained merely prohibitory relief. 165
IV. Analysis
Unlike high courts in Iowa, Delaware, New Jersey, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not
yet decided whether a petition for a victim protection order is a status
determination, a civil injunction that requires personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant, or if the jurisdictional requisites vary depending on
whether prohibitive or affirmative relief is ordered.
It is unquestionable that the state of Oklahoma has a strong interest in
protecting people residing within its borders. Specifically, there is a strong
state interest in protecting people within the state from acts of domestic
violence. 166 Just two years after the passage of the Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals commented:
In the absence of any legislative history, it is reasonable to
assume the passage of the Act is a result of increased public
awareness regarding the serious nature of domestic violence.
The Legislature has attempted to remedy this problem by
providing immediate, as well as long-range, protection for the
victims of domestic abuse.167
The court went on to state that “[t]he State=s interest in providing this
protection to the victims of domestic abuse is apparent. The [Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act] promotes the health, safety and general welfare
of its citizens.” 168 The Oklahoma legislature equipped the people with a
tool to combat domestic violence C access to victim protection orders. At
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 582.
Id. (quoting McNair v. McNair, 856 A.2d 5, 14 (N.H. 2004)).
See id.
See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25, & 9, 686 P.2d 990, 993.
Id. && 6, 18, 686 P.2d at 993, 996.
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the same time, this public policy and safety concern may threaten
nonresident defendants= due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.169 An analysis of the three
approaches taken by other courts and described in Part III of this article
leads to the conclusion that Oklahoma courts cannot deny nonresident
defendants due process by pretending victim protection orders are status
determinations, and that statutory amendments would be the best method to
assert personal jurisdiction over those nonresident defendants
A. Because a Victim Protection Order Is a Civil Injunction, Oklahoma Must
Have Personal Jurisdiction over a Nonresident Defendant in Order to
Safeguard Due Process
With any court order entered against an individual, the requirement of
personal jurisdiction is the standard rule. 170 Victim protection orders are no
exception. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
warned attorneys representing victims that they should “[b]e prepared to
counter respondents= arguments based upon alleged due process violations
and lack of personal jurisdiction, especially in inter-jurisdictional cases.” 171
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, without making a specific
determination as to whether personal jurisdiction is the requisite standard
for issuing a victim protection order against a nonresident defendant,
defaulted to personal jurisdiction when it was faced with a similar
situation. 172 In Stacy v. Ferrel, Carolyn Stacy and her ex-boyfriend, Paul
Ferrel, both lived in Texas. 173 Ferrel harassed and stalked Stacey in Texas,
and as a result she eventually moved to Ada, Oklahoma. 174 Within a month
169. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, ' 1.
170. See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 732-3 (1878); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))
(“It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in
favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.”).
171. FAMILY VIOLENCE DEP=T., NAT=L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAM. CT. JUDGES, A
GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE ISSUANCE & ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTION ORDERS 40 (2005)
[hereinafter GUIDE].
172. Stacy v. Ferrel, No. 101,253, & 11 (Okla. Civ. App. Jan. 6, 2006), http://oklegal.
onenet.net/sample.basic.html (In the Database Menu select “OK Court of Appeals Opinions
(1968-Current)”; search for “Stacy” in Field “Appellant”; search for “Ferrel” in Field
“Appellee”; then Submit Query). As of the publication date of this Comment, Stacy has not
yet been released for publication in the permanent law reports, nor has Stacy been made
available on a widely used electronic database. The publication status of the case is publicly
accessible through the Oklahoma Public Legal Research System. See id.
173. Id. & 1.
174. Id. && 1-2.

842

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:821

after moving to Oklahoma, Stacy filed a petition for a victim protection
order against Ferrel. 175 In her petition she alleged that Ferrel attempted to
follow her in Oklahoma. 176 Ferrel made a special appearance challenging
the state=s exercise of personal jurisdiction and offered evidence that he was
not in the state of Oklahoma on the date Stacy claimed. 177 The district
court found that the state did have personal jurisdiction over Ferrel,
presumably because the act that was the basis of Stacy=s cause of action
allegedly occurred in the state.178 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the
district court=s decision. 179 It found that Stacy did not meet her burden of
establishing Ferrel=s minimum contacts with Oklahoma which would
subject him to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court.180
1. Victim Protection Orders are Civil Injunctions
Amidst the confusion among the courts as to what jurisdictional
requisites are required before issuing a victim protection order against a
nonresident defendant, a simple question needs to be answered. What is a
victim protection order? A victim protection order is a civil injunction.181
In Curry v. Streater, the Oklahoma Supreme Court very clearly asserted
that a victim protection order “is analogous to an injunction.”182 Three
defining characteristics of injunctions are readily identifiable in victim
protection orders. First, an “[i]njunction is an equitable remedy.” 183
Likewise, a victim protection order is an equitable remedy; it does not
provide a legal remedy for liability, such as money damages for the battery
committed. Second, an injunction is designed to protect one party=s rights
“by prohibiting or commanding certain acts” of another party. 184 An
injunction demands that the defendant refrain from “a wrongful act or the
causing of some threatened or anticipated injury.” 185 That is precisely what
a victim protection order does, but the wrongful act the defendant is
prohibited from doing is commonly assaulting, threatening, contacting, or
175. Id. & 1.
176. Id.
177. Id. & 2.
178. See id. && 4, 10.
179. Id. & 12.
180. Id. & 12.
181. See Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 8, 213. P3d 550, 554.
182. Id.
183. 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions ' 1 (2000); see also Barnes v. State, 1963 OK 152, &
18, 383 P.2d 635, 639 (citing Fahr v. State, 1951 OK 286, & 7, 237 P.2d 128, 130) (“[A]n
action for a permanent injunction . . . is an action of equitable cognizance.”).
184. 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions ' 1 (2000).
185. Id. ' 4.
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harassing the plaintiff-victim. These specific acts pose a very serious,
imminent risk to the plaintiff=s safety and would likely result in injury.
Third, injunctive relief is “preventative or protective in character and
operates upon unperformed acts rather than upon those that have already
occurred.” 186
Oklahoma courts have long held that an injunction “is to afford only
preventative relief; it is powerless to correct wrongs or injuries already
committed.” 187 This is also true of the relief afforded through a victim
protection order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in 2009, asserted “[t]he
[Protection from Domestic Abuse] Act=s clear purpose is preventative, and
the Act provides immediate, civil, nonmonetary relief for victims of
domestic abuse . . . [t]o effectuate its purpose, the Act provides for courts to
issue civil protection orders to prevent violence before it happens.”188
A victim protection order is a type of injunction because it is intended to
protect the plaintiff from the recurrence of abuse or the materialization of
threats into future violence. 189 Furthermore, a victim protection order in
itself is not a criminal judgment against the defendant, nor is it a civil, legal
remedy intended to redress the wrongs committed by the defendant. 190
Often the terms victim protection order and injunction are used
synonymously. 191 For example, in the Violence Against Women Act, the
United States Congress= definition of protection order included:
[A]ny injunction, restraining order, or any other order issued by
a civil . . . court for the purpose of preventing violent or
threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or
contact or communication with or physical proximity to, another
186. Id. ' 1.
187. Walcott v. Dennes, 1911 OK 285, & 3, 116 P. 784, 786 (quoting City of Alma v.
Loehr, 22 P. 616 (Kan. 1889)).
188. Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 10, 213 P.3d 550, 555.
189. See e.g., Waul, supra note 8, at 53 (“[S]tates began passing legislation allowing
judges to grant injunctive orders to immediately stop abusive behavior between two
parties.”) (emphasis added).
190. See Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK CIV APP 25, & 10, 686 P.2d 990, 993; see
also Walcott, & 3, 116 P. at 786 (“[T]he exclusive function of a writ of injunction is to afford
only preventative relief; it is powerless to correct wrongs or injuries already committed.”).
191. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 13, at 353 (footnotes omitted) (“The [Protection from
Domestic Abuse] Act provides that a protective order may be enforced by the civil court that
issued the injunction or by the criminal courts.”); GUIDE, supra note 171, at 51 (“Attorneys
should work with other community members to make injunctive relief effective for
clients.”); Tobkin v. State, 777 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he
legislature has made a petition for injunction against domestic violence a private [cause of]
action. . . . “).
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person, including any temporary or final order issued by a civil
or criminal court . . . obtained by filing an independent action . . .
. 192
Whether deemed analogous or synonymous, victim protection orders
serve the purpose of civil injunctions C they order the defendant to refrain
from a specific act or acts that would likely result in injury to the plaintiff.
In Marquette, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found, “[the Protection
from Domestic Abuse] Act . . . creates an additional framework through
which the court may exercise its long recognized equitable power to grant
restraining and injunctive orders in extraordinary circumstances.” 193
2. Because Victim Protection Orders Are Civil Injunctions, Personal
Jurisdiction Is Required to Satisfy Due Process
The next foundational question that must be answered is whether courts
are required to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before granting a
civil injunction. The settled rule is that an injunction operates in
personam. 194 If a victim protection order is actually a relatively recent,
statutorily-guided civil injunction, then victim protection orders ought to be
treated like injunctions. Where Oklahoma=s Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act is silent, the law governing traditional civil injunctions ought to
govern victim protection orders.
Thus far, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has fallen in line with this
proposition. When faced with the decision of how the court should
evaluate the issuance of victim protection orders on appeal, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has relied on the law of civil injunctions. 195 In Curry, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented with an issue of first impression
and it addressed the standard of review for victim protection orders issued
under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act. 196 The court held that
“proceedings under the Act . . . should be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion” because “[a] protection order under the Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act . . . is analogous to an injunction.” 197 The court relied
on the abuse of discretion standard of review for granting or denying an
192. 18 U.S.C. ' 2266(5)(A) (2006).
193. Marquette, & 11, 686 P.2d at 994 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
194. Barnes v. State, 1963 OK 152, & 19, 383 P.2d 635, 639 (citing Howard v.
Berryman, 1930 OK 267, & 10, 288 P. 605, 607 (“The remedy of injunction is strictly in
personam. The decree operates and is enforceable against the individual . . . .”)).
195. See Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 8, 213 P.3d 550, 554.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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injunction, and held that the proper standard of review for issuing a victim
protection order is, likewise, abuse of discretion.198
If a victim protection order is an injunction, and appellate courts apply
the same standard of review for both injunctions and victim protection
orders because they are essentially the same legal tool, then it follows that
the same jurisdictional limitations that apply when Oklahoma courts enjoin
the acts of a nonresident defendant ought to apply when issuing victim
protections orders against a nonresident defendant. An injunction issued by
an Oklahoma district court must comport with due process, and is valid
only if the issuing court has personal jurisdiction over the parties. 199
Therefore, if a victim protection order issued by an Oklahoma district court
is an injunction, it is only valid if the court has personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant-abuser. Without personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, a victim protection order issued by the state of Oklahoma
violates the defendant=s right to procedural due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 200
Arguments that victim protections orders should not be governed by the
law of injunctions culminate around the unique characteristics and
provisions that distinguish the Protection from Domestic Violence Act from
the civil injunction statutes. First, the Oklahoma legislature designated a
specific section of the Oklahoma Statutes to provide for victim protection
orders. 201 Victim protection orders do not come under the general civil
injunction statute. 202 Instead, the Oklahoma legislature elected to create a
“special statute[] that provide[s] alternate procedures for the obtaining of
temporary restraining orders or temporary injunctions.” 203 Additionally, the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act was not incorporated into the state=s
criminal code; the criminal prosecution of the defendant-abuser is not a

198. Id. (citing Johnson v. Ward, 1975 OK 129, & 42, 541 P.2d 182, 188).
199. Howard, & 10, 288 P. at 607 (“An injunction operates in personam and it will not
issue against one not within the jurisdiction of the Court.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions ' 1 (2000) (“An injunction will not issue against one
who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.”). An injunction provides equitable relief
and a court must have both subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties to
exercise its power. See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity ' 62 (2008).
200. See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
201. Compare 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007), with 12 OKLA. STAT.
'' 1381-1397 (2001). “This section shall not apply . . . to proceedings brought pursuant to
special statutes that provide alternate procedures for the obtaining of temporary restraining
orders or temporary injunctions.” 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1384.1.E (2001).
202. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1384.1 (2001).
203. Id. ' 1384.1.E.
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prerequisite for obtaining a victim protection order under the Act.204 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
an injunction will not issue to restrain commission of a
threatened act merely to prevent the violation of a penal statute .
. . unless a statute provides a remedy by injunction to restrain
violations . . . [W]here an injunction is otherwise warranted, the
court may enjoin certain acts affecting rights, property and
general welfare of people even though such acts are also criminal
offenses. 205
Second, unlike most civil actions, the plaintiff-victim does not have to
pay court fees and costs, including “the filing fee, service of process fee,
[or] attorneys fees.” 206 This is indicative of the legislature=s objective of
providing victims greater access to victim protection orders. As a matter of
fact, the only time the plaintiff filing for a victim protection order would
have to pay attorneys fees and courts costs is if the court makes a special
finding that the petition for a protection order was filed frivolously. 207
Third, when a civil injunction is violated, the courts may hold the
defendant in civil contempt. 208 When found in contempt, the violator may
be kept in custody until he complies with the injunction, or be fined up to
two-hundred dollars per day of noncompliance and serve up to six months
in jail. 209 When a victim protection order is violated, the defendant faces
criminal sanctions which may result in a five-thousand dollar fine and up to
one year in the county jail.210 The criminal sanctions imposed for violating
a victim protection order demonstrate the serious nature of domestic abuse
and the state=s interest in preventing abuse. However poignant these
arguments may be, they do not justify classifying victim protection orders
as something other than civil injunctions with specific statutorily-defined
characteristics and the legislatively-sanctioned possibility of criminal
contempt for violation.
Requiring personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant before the
court issues a victim protection order not only safeguards the defendant=s
right to due process, but it also ensures maximum protection for the victim.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
Anderson v. Trimble, 1974 OK 2, & 23, 519 P.2d 1352, 1356.
22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2.C.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
Id. ' 60.2.C.2.
12 OKLA. STAT. ' 1390 (2001).
Id.
22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.6.B.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
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The federal government acknowledged the interstate nature of domestic
violence and provided additional protection for victims in the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA). 211 The VAWA sets out that: “Any
protection order issued . . . by the court of one State . . . shall be accorded
full faith and credit by the court of another State . . . and enforced by the
court and law enforcement personnel of the other State” so long as the
issuing “court has jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of
such State.” 212 The VAWA requires that a victim protection order be given
full faith and credit if the order is valid.213 An order is only valid if the
court issuing the order has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 214 If
the issuing court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
constitutional due process requirements have not been met. 215 Oklahoma
adopted the VAWA=s position in the Uniform Interstate Enforcement of
Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act.216 The VAWA also makes it a
crime for an abuser to travel across state lines for the purpose of violating a
victim protection order. 217 This provision of VAWA is particularly
important to self-enforcement of a victim protection order. In the scenarios
examined in this comment the abuser and victim live in different states.
As a result, if an Oklahoma court has personal jurisdiction over the outof-state defendant and issues a valid victim protection order against him,
and the abuser wishes to violate the order and pursue his victim in
Oklahoma, he is not only subject to the criminal sanctions imposed by the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, but also a federal, criminal
penalty. 218 Again, to gain the protections of the VAWA, the court must
issue a valid order that complies with due process. Without personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, the order does not have to be given full faith
and credit by other states, nor is the defendant subject to federal criminal
law for violating the order.

211. 18 U.S.C. '' 2261-2266 (2006).
212. Id. ' 2265(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis added).
213. See id.
214. Susan B. Carbon et al., Enforcing Domestic Violence Protection Orders Throughout
the Country: New Frontiers of Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 50 JUV. & FAM.
CT. J. 39, 40 (1999); JANET R. FINK, Full Faith and Credit Mandate, in THE IMPACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 9-7, 9-11 (Deborah M. Goelman et al. eds.,
1996).
215. Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection
Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 256 (1995).
216. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.21-60.29 (2008).
217. 18 U.S.C. ' 2262 (2006).
218. See id.; 22 OKLA. STAT. ''60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
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3. Oklahoma May Have Personal Jurisdiction over Some Nonresident
Defendants That Commit Acts of Domestic Abuse Outside the State
The final question one must ask is whether nonresident defendants, such
as John in the opening hypothetical, come within Oklahoma=s jurisdiction.
A nonresident defendant is not subject to adjudication in Oklahoma courts
unless Oklahoma has personal jurisdiction over him. 219 Oklahoma has
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if: (1) the defendant
consents to the jurisdiction of the courts by making a general appearance
and failing to raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction;220 (2) the defendant is
served with process in the state of Oklahoma; 221 or (3) the defendant has
certain “minimum contacts with [the state of Oklahoma] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” 222 Without personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, due process is violated.223
In Kulko, the United States Supreme Court applied the minimum
contacts principle set forth in International Shoe v. Washington to domestic
relations. 224 The Court ruled that mere acquiescence of a divorced father,
who was a resident of New York, to his daughter=s desire to live with her
mother in California did not confer jurisdiction to the California court in a
custody dispute. 225 The Court explained that “[t]he unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant” does not
by itself satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.226 Instead, the court
held that there must be some purposeful act by the nonresident such that the
nonresident makes use “of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State.” 227 Thus, the quality and nature of the nonresident defendant=s
activities must be such that it is reasonable and fair to require him to defend
the lawsuit in Oklahoma “notwithstanding that the forum state and the
plaintiff have an interest in proceeding in the forum state.”228
219. See Int=l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
220. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2012.F.1 (2001 & Supp. 2007); First Tex. Sav. Ass=n v.
Bernsen, 1996 OK CIV APP 24, & 6, 921 P.2d 1293, 1296.
221. See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
222. Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of Okla., 2006 OK 58, & 16, 152 P.3d 165, 173 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
223. See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
224. Id. at 88, 92.
225. Id. at 94.
226. Id. at 93-4 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
227. Id. at 94.
228. Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61, & 12, 74 P.3d 612, 616 (citing Kulko, 436
U.S. at 92).
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An Oklahoma court applied the reasoning in Kulko when a father
appealed the trial court=s finding of personal jurisdiction and ordered child
support and the division of he and his former spouse=s property. 229 The
disputed facts of Gullo v. Gullo provided that a wife and husband lived in
Ohio, where she was abused. 230 She moved to Oklahoma and filed for
dissolution of marriage and sought child support. 231 The court determined
that in this situation, the traditional criteria for obtaining personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant applied.232 The husband did not
have minimum contacts with Oklahoma, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals rejected the wife=s argument that public policy for providing
support for Oklahoma children sustained personal jurisdiction.233 Based on
the court=s decision in Gullo, Oklahoma courts are not likely to assert
personal jurisdiction merely because of Oklahoma=s interest in protecting
victims of domestic violence that live in the state. 234
Oklahoma adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)
in the mid-1990s. 235 Section 601-201 of Oklahoma=s version of UIFSA
provides:
A. In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to
determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual . . . if: 1. The
individual is personally served with summons within this state;
2. The individuals submits to the jurisdiction of this state by
consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a
responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to
personal jurisdiction; 3. The individual resided with the child in
this state; 4. The individual resided in this state and provided
prenatal expenses or support for the child. 5. The child resides in
this state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual; . .
. 8. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of
229. Id. & 5, 74 P.3d at 614.
230. Id. && 2, 6, 74 P.3d at 614.
231. Id. && 2, 3, 74 P.3d at 614. A wife claimed Oklahoma had jurisdiction under
UIFSA because her child was in Oklahoma as a result of acts or directives of the nonresident
parent to be charged with the support obligation, see 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201.A.5 (2001 &
Supp. 2007), but the court rejected this argument because of the trial court=s failure to make
a finding of fact. See Gullo, && 7, 9, 749 P.3d at 614.
232. See id. & 23, 74 P.3d at 617 (citing Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir.
1990)). See also 43 OKLA. STAT. '' 601-201.A.5-.8 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
233. Gullo & 30, 74 P.3d at 618.
234. See id. & 15, 74 P.3d at 616.
235. 43 OKLA. STAT. '' 601-100 to 601-901 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
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this state and the United States for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. 236
In Powers v. District Court of Tulsa County, 237 the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held that 43 Okla. Stat. ' 601-201.A.5., as a method of acquiring
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, complied with due
process. 238
In Powers, the husband and wife resided in Missouri, where the husband
allegedly abused the wife. 239 The wife moved to Oklahoma and within a
few days filed for legal separation, alimony, and child support, among other
matrimonial-based claims. 240 The nonresident husband filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in the District Court. 241 The
husband=s motion to dismiss was granted, because the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.242 Upon reconsideration, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court focused on the wife=s argument that her
husband=s activities in Missouri “forced or directed her to move to
Oklahoma.” 243 The wife distinguished her situation from the wife in Kulko
and asserted that “her presence in Oklahoma did not result from her
unilateral conduct and [her h]usband=s mere acquiescence, but from
purposeful conduct [of her h]usband.” 244 The court determined that in
Kulko, the plaintiff-mother=s conduct was unilateral because the nonresident
defendant-father merely consented to his daughter living in California with
her mother and sent her there.245 Likewise, Oklahoma has observed that “a
parent=s mere acquiescence, or agreement, in one state for a child=s
residence in a second state does not satisfy the ‘effects test;’ i.e., the
acquiescence does not thereby cause an ‘effect’ in the second state
justifying in personam jurisdiction.” 246 The “effects” test recognizes that

236. See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201.A (2001 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
237. Powers v. Dist. Ct. of Tulsa Co., 2009 OK 91, 227 P.3d 1060.
238. See id. & 35, 227 P.3d at 1081.
239. Id. & 15, 227 P.3d at 1072.
240. Id. & 2, 227 P.3d at 1065.
241. Id. & 14, 227 P.3d at 1071.
242. See id.
243. Id. & 23, 227 P.3d at 1075.
244. Id. & 23, 227 P.3d at 1075-76.
245. Id. & 25, 227 P.3d at 1076-77 (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 94
(1978)).
246. See id. & 25, 227 P.3d at 1077 (citing Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61, &&
14-16, 74 P.3d 612, 626).
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an individual may cause an effect in one state as a consequence of acts
performed outside the state. 247
In Kulko, the United States Supreme Court noted that the state of
California had “not attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying
such cases in its courts, by e.g. enacting a special jurisdictional statute.” 248
But, unlike California law at the time Kulko was decided, Oklahoma had
adopted Title 43, Section 601-201, which is a special jurisdictional
statute. 249 In Powers, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the husband=s
argument and upheld the United States Supreme Court=s due process
jurisprudence that the defendant=s “physical presence in Missouri and not
Oklahoma is insufficient, by itself, to negate in personam jurisdiction based
upon a minimum contacts test.” 250 The court echoed the United States
Supreme Court in Kulko, “The minimum contacts’ test . . . is not
susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be
weighed to determine whether the requisite affiliating circumstances are
present.” 251
In Powers, the court directed its attention to In re Marriage of
Malwitz, 252 decided by the Colorado Supreme Court.253 In Malwitz, the
court examined Colorado=s UIFSA statute and the language identical to that
contained in ' 601-201 of Oklahoma=s UIFSA statute, which provides a
basis for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if “[t]he child
resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the
[defendant].” 254 The Colorado Supreme Court found that based on the
defendant=s acts of domestic violence against the plaintiff in Texas, “the
Defendant=s actions were sufficient to constitute >acts or directives= that
caused [the plaintiff] to flee Texas for Colorado within the meaning of
[UIFSA].” 255 The court found that the affirmative acts of the defendant C
persistent abuse and harassment C effectively forced his pregnant wife and
her daughter to flee Texas for Colorado. 256 Furthermore, “[a]lthough the
247. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 96 (Court viewed this test as “reach[ing] wrongful activity
outside the State causing injury within the State.”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAWS ' 37 (1971).
248. Gullo, & 19, 74 P.3d at 616-17 (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98).
249. 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
250. See Powers, 2009 OK 91, & 24, 227 P.3d at 1075.
251. Id. & 22 (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92) (internal quotations omitted).
252. In re Marriage of Malwitz, 99 P.3d 56 (Colo. 2004).
253. See Powers, 2009 OK 91, & 26, 227 P.3d at 1078 (citing Malwitz, 99 P.3d at 5859).
254. See id. (quoting 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201.A.5).
255. Malwitz, 99 P.3d at 59.
256. See id. at 61.
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defendant did not specifically direct [the plaintiff] to leave . . . [she was
left] with little choice but to leave Texas and seek safety near her father=s
home in Colorado.” 257 There were affiliating circumstances that brought
the defendant in Malwitz within Colorado=s jurisdiction. First, the wife=s
only family resided in Colorado and the court determined the abusive
husband knew or should have known that because of his actions his wife
would flee to the protection of her family. 258 Second, “very little time
passed between the harassment” and abuse and the wife=s fleeing from
Texas to Colorado for shelter.259
The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the Colorado Supreme Court
and held:
Although acts of child and spouse abuse in one state are
insufficient, by themselves, to create in personam jurisdiction
over a non-resident spouse in a different state, we do agree with
the Supreme Court of Colorado that affiliating circumstances
such as those in Malwitz may provide the facts necessary to
show that an abusive spouse is purposefully availing himself or
herself of conducting activity in the forum state by directing and
controlling where the abused spouse and child reside.260
The Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated what affiliating circumstances
district courts should consider when deciding whether a plaintiff=s location
in Oklahoma is a result of the acts and directives of the defendant, thus
conferring personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.261 In
Powers, these affiliating circumstances included: (1) the husband=s
agreement and desire that his family go to Oklahoma; (2) the wife=s
relocation to Oklahoma as a result of the husband=s physical abuse; (3) the
wife=s relocation to Oklahoma was the result of the husband=s complete and
abrupt failure of both spousal and child economic support; and (4) the
husband=s awareness that his lack of support required the wife and child to
relocate to Oklahoma. 262 The court found that because the “[h]usband
allegedly created the circumstances of his wife and child living in
Oklahoma without his economic support . . . Kulko cannot . . . be read as

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
See id. at 59, 61.
Id. at 61.
Powers v. Dist. Ct. of Tulsa Cnty., 2009 OK 91, & 32, 227 P.3d 1060, 1080.
See id. & 34, 227 P.3d at 1080.
Id. & 30, 227 P.3d at 1078-79.
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requiring a . . . wife and child to always seek legal relief only in the nonresident=s state of residence.” 263
Section 601-201 cannot be read broader than what due process
permits. 264 In Gullo, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that section 601201 must be interpreted in harmony with due process and the United States
Supreme Court=s decision in Kulko. 265 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that allegations of spousal abuse committed by the nonresident spouse in
another jurisdiction and the affiliating circumstances C including the
nonresident spouse=s purposeful conduct that caused the abused spouse to
relocate in Oklahoma C may be used pursuant to Title 43, Section 601201.A.5 of the Oklahoma Statutes to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident spouse and is consistent with due process of law. 266 The court
noted that in Malwitz, the Colorado Supreme Court observed that “all states
share a common interest in protecting victims of domestic abuse and
providing an effective means for redress for such victims.” 267 But the
Oklahoma Supreme Court left the state=s interest there and stated that “[a]n
interest to protect children and spouses that is shared in common with other
forums, whether from abuse or lack of economic support, is insufficient, by
itself, to make Oklahoma a fair forum as to a nonresident.” 268 While this
may seem counter-intuitive to Oklahoma=s desire to protect those residing
within its borders, the constitutional guarantee of due process afforded
defendants in civil disputes C including abusers C cannot be sacrificed in
the name of public policy.
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court is correct in finding that Section 601201 of Title 43 is a constitutional basis for exercising personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident in family support cases, it is logical to extend this
reasoning when seeking a victim protection order against a nonresident
defendant. UIFSA as it exists today does not address victim protection

263. Id. & 31, 227 P.3d at 1079-80.
264. Id. & 28, 227 P.3d at 1078.
265. Id. & 28, 227 P.3d at 1078 n. 52; see also Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61,
&& 18, 26, 74 P.3d 612, 616, 618.
266. Powers, 2009 OK 91, & 36, 227 P.3d at 1081; but see id. & 4, 227 P.3d at 1082
(Opala, J., concurring) (“I must counsel against taking an activist posture on any
unsettled point of federal constitutional law. Instead of pressing today for desired
changed in the current state of the law I would much rather await further developments in
the U.S. Supreme Court=s jurisprudence.”).
267. Id. & 31, 227 P.3d at 1079 (quoting In re Marriage of Malwitz, 99 P.3d 56, 63
(Colo. 2004)).
268. Id. & 31.
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orders, and it would be erroneous to include the issuance of victim
protection orders in this section of the Oklahoma Statutes.
The plain language of Oklahoma=s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act
does not address jurisdiction. 269 Victim protection statutes of other states,
such as Pennsylvania, overtly demand personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 270 The best solution for Oklahoma is to add a provision to the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act that specifies jurisdiction regarding
victim protection orders. This provision could include language quite
similar to that in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). 271
The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act ought to read as follows: “In a
proceeding to issue a victim protection order, a tribunal of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual if the victim
resides in Oklahoma as a result of the acts or directives of the individual.”
The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act would then embody the state=s
particular interest in adjudicating these disputes and contain special
jurisdictional language, thus comporting with constitutional due process. 272
Following Powers, Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction if the nonresident
defendant abused the plaintiff and affiliating circumstances existed to show
the defendant-abuser purposefully availed himself of this forum by
controlling where the victim resided by effectively forcing her to seek
shelter in Oklahoma. 273
Even if the method of ascertaining personal jurisdiction under UIFSA
and Powers is not employed as a means of exercising personal jurisdiction
over nonresident abusers in petitions for victim protection orders and the
state cannot bring the abuser within its judicial jurisdiction, the victim
residing in Oklahoma is not without a remedy. The primary criticism of
requiring personal jurisdiction over the defendant is that while it ensures
procedural due process to the defendant, it undermines the state=s interest in
the prevention of domestic violence. The abuser may continue to pose a
threat to his victim after she flees to Oklahoma. 274 The victim must be
269. See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60-60.18 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
270. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. ' 6103(b) (West Supp. 2010) (“The right of the
plaintiff to relief under this chapter shall not be affected by . . . [t]he defendant=s absence
from this Commonwealth or the defendant=s nonresidence in this Commonwealth, provided
that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant . . . .”) (emphasis added).
271. See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 601-201 (2001 &
Supp. 2009).
272. See Gullo v. Gullo, 2003 OK CIV APP 61, & 19, 74 P.3d 612, 616-17 (quoting
Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978)).
273. See Powers v. Dist. Ct. of Tulsa Cnty., 2009 OK 91, & 32, 227 P.3d 1060, 1080.
274. See GUIDE, supra note 171, at 60 (advising judges to “[u]se the state=s long-arm
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faced with the reality of abuse again before she is afforded the state=s
protection, because the abuser must establish minimum contacts with this
state.
The first likely scenario and possible way that the abuser could establish
minimum contacts with the state (without committing acts of physical
violence within the state) is that the abuser pursues the victim into
Oklahoma, where she is seeking shelter.275 Second, placing phone calls
into the state may be enough to sustain personal jurisdiction because the
abuser knows when he makes the calls that they are being purposefully
directed at the victim in the state.276
Alternatively, the victim could always return to the place of abuse or
where the defendant resides and apply for a victim protection order under
that state=s law. For example, Sarah from the opening hypothetical would
need to return to Kansas. The jurisdictional issue does not arise if the
petition for protection is filed in the defendant=s state of residence.
Furthermore, when Sarah comes back to Oklahoma, the valid Kansas order
will be given “full faith and credit” by the state of Oklahoma. 277 While this
option is not the most desirable, it is effective, because the issuing court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Unfortunately, all of these scenarios require a greater risk of danger to
the victim than simply issuing the victim protection order as a status
determination, or without affirmative relief. This is incongruent with
Oklahoma=s policy behind the passage of the Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act. Another criticism of requiring personal jurisdiction is that it
undermines the Oklahoma legislature=s emphasis on access in the Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act. 278 Read to exclude applicability to nonresident
statute to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state respondents who pose a continuing threat to
victims who have fled across state lines”).
275. See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 796 A.2d 879 (N.J. 2002). A husband abused his wife in
New York. Id. at 880. The wife went to her sister=s house in New Jersey for safety. Id. The
husband came to the house in New Jersey. Id. Because the husband pursued his victim from
New York and committed an act of violence against her in New Jersey (pounding on her
sister=s house), the court found there was personal jurisdiction. Id. at 888.
276. See McNair v. McNair, 856 A.2d 5, 13-15 (N.H. 2004) (phone calls were the acts
upon which the cause of action was based and alleged in petition for victim protection
order); Beckers v. Seck, 14 S.W.3d 139, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); A.R. v. M.R., 799 A.2d
27, 31-32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that the abuser=s mere promise to pursue
the victim before she left the state where he resides would not have been enough to sustain
personal jurisdiction). But see Anderson v. Deas, 615 S.E.2d 859, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
(requiring abuser=s physical entry into Georgia to establish minimum contacts).
277. 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.12.A (2001).
278. See 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.2 (providing for standard filing forms and waiving filing
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defendant-abusers, the Act only provides protection to a limited group of
women C those whose abusers are located in the state and those who were
abused in the state. Victims who escape the home they share with their
abusers and come to Oklahoma looking for support and safety in the homes
of their friends and family will not find further protection in emergency ex
parte victim protection orders.
B. A Victim Protection Order Is Not a Status Determination Because It
Does Not Alter the Relationship Status of the Victim and the Abuser
The adjudication of a plaintiff=s status in relation to a defendant does not
require personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, because the
court is not asserting a personal judgment against the defendant and the
status of those within the state=s borders is of great interest to the state. 279
While states certainly have a strong interest in protecting victims, a victim
protection order is not an adjudication of the victim=s status because it does
not alter the relationship between the parties.280 The Supreme Court of
Iowa in Bartsch incorrectly held that a victim protection order “does not
purport to grant affirmative relief against the defendant; it merely preserves
the protected status accorded to the plaintiff.” 281 A significant flaw in the
court=s reasoning was its failure to support its proposition that “protected
victim” is a recognized declaration on the status relationship between the
plaintiff-victim and the defendant-abuser, and Oklahoma courts should not
embrace this approach.
The Bartsch court relied on In re Adoption of J.L.H., an Oklahoma
Supreme Court case, in extending status jurisdiction to include the issuance
of victim protection orders. 282 J.L.H. was an adoption case; adoption
clearly affects the status relationship of the parties to the lawsuit.283 In
J.L.H., the biological mother-defendant was a nonresident of Oklahoma. 284
The biological father and stepmother petitioned for the nonconsensual
adoption of her children. 285 The Oklahoma Court acknowledged that the
fees); id. ' 60.3 (allowing for temporary victim protection orders to be granted ex parte).
279. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 734 (1877) (“The jurisdiction which every State possesses, to determine the civil status
and capacities of all its inhabitants. . . .”).
280. But see Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Iowa 2001) (holding that a victim
protection order is an adjudication of the victim=s status).
281. Id. at 6.
282. See id. at 8 (citing In re Adoption of J.L.H., 1987 OK 25, 737 P.2d 915).
283. See In re Adoption of J.L.H., 1987 OK 25, & 1, 737 P.2d 915, 917.
284. See id., & 2, 737 P.2d at 917.
285. See id., & 3, 737 P.2d at 917.
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“minimum contacts doctrine . . . was fashioned to gauge the standards of
due process for the exercise of jurisdiction to render an in personam
judgment against one not served within the state.” 286 In J.L.H., however, no
in personam judgment was sought against the nonresident mother; rather,
the plaintiffs were asking the court to rule on the status relationship
between the nonresident defendant and her children. 287 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court referred to the Restatement of Judgments and the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws before extending status jurisdiction to nonconsensual adoption. 288 According to Section 7 of the Restatement of
Judgments, “[a] state may exercise jurisdiction to establish or terminate a
status if the status has a sufficient relationship to the state.”289 Those
relationships include divorce, legal separation, marriage annulment,
adoption, and child custody. 290 In J.L.H., the court found “Oklahoma=s
cognizance is invoked to settle the status of [the nonresident defendant=s]
minor children.” 291 What was adjudicated was a “quest to change the
underage children=s parental status vis-a-vis [sic] their nonresident and
noncustodial mother.” 292
The Supreme Court of Iowa took the strong state interest in protecting
victims and, without sound reasoning, twisted it into a status
A victim protection order does not parallel an
determination. 293
adjudication affecting the family relationship; therefore, it is not a status
determination.
In fact, the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act
specifically creates a cause of action for victims that are not in a legal
relationship with their abusers. 294 There is unquestionably a strong state
interest in protecting victims of abuse, but that does not justify reclassifying
a cause of action for equitable relief as a declaration of one=s status. 295 If an
286. Id., & 9, 737 P.2d at 919.
287. See id.
288. See id. n.13.
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ' 7 (1982) (“Relationships sufficient to
support exercises of such jurisdiction in matters of family status are stated in Restatement,
Second, Conflict of Laws '' 70-79.”).
290. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS '' 70-79 (1971).
291. J.L.H., & 9, 737 P.2d at 919 n.13.
292. Id. & 9, 737 P.2d at 918.
293. See Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Iowa 2001).
294. See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.1.1, 60.1.4-60.1.5 (2001 & Supp. 2007). Victims can file
a petition for a victim protection order if they have lived or live in the same household with
their abuser, regardless of their marital status, or if they have been in a dating relationship
with their abuser. See id.
295. See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 11 (Carter, J., dissenting) (“What Tara Bartsch sought
from an Iowa court was not a declaration of her status, but rather a grant of injunctive relief
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order of protection is not a status determination and the court issuing the
order does not have personal jurisdiction, due process has been violated.
The concurring opinion in Doe v. Iowa District Court for Scott County
echoed the arguments of the Bartsch dissent. 296 The relief prescribed in a
victim protection order goes “beyond a status determination and
constitute[s] a grant of injunctive relief against the defendant, and . . .
therefore require[s] that the defendant have minimum contacts with the
State of Iowa sufficient to avoid offending historical and well-developed
concepts of due process of law.” 297 It is also noteworthy that while Iowa
was the first state to rule on this issue, there is disagreement among its own
high court, and the majority=s reasoning has rarely been followed by
jurisdictions outside of Iowa. 298
A victim protection order, which demands or forbids specific behavior
between the parties, alters the relationship between plaintiff and defendant
to the same degree as when the court enjoins one farmer from tilling the
land of a neighboring farmer. The once-amicable relationship between the
two farmers is likely to sour. Certainly, no one would argue this court order
alters the status relationship between the farmers. There is a stark
difference between commanding the defendant to do a specific act or to
refrain from certain acts and establishing, modifying, or terminating a status
relationship between a citizen of the state and a nonresident. A victim
protection order is the former type of action.
C. Allowing a Distinction Between Prohibitive And Affirmative Relief to
Have an Effect on Jurisdictional Requirements Is Without Precedent
The courts in Spencer, Caplan, Hemenway, and Shah found that so long
as the victim protection order is limited to prohibitive orders and does not
assert affirmative obligations on the nonresident defendant, personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is not needed to satisfy due
process. 299 While this approach is appealing because it purports to ensure
against a party beyond the jurisdiction of the Iowa court. Nor did the district court attempt
to adjudicate her status in any manner.”).
296. No. 06-0696, 2007 WL 913851, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2007) (Miller, J.,
concurring).
297. Id.
298. But see Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 124 (Mass. 2008). The Massachusetts
Supreme Court did not adopt Bartsch in its pure form. The court defined constitutional
limitations for status determinations and held that if the victim protection order provides for
so-called affirmative relief, personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is required.
Id.
299. Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Caplan v. Donovan, 879
N.E.2d 117, 124-25 (Mass. 2008); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 582 (N.H.
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due process and also supply effective relief to domestic violence victims, it
is unfounded. These courts draw a distinction between ordering an abuser
to do a specific act, such as attending domestic violence counseling300 or
compensating the plaintiff, 301 and ordering him not to do a specific act, such
as not contacting or abusing the plaintiff. 302 These distinctions are
problematic at best C and specious at worst C because these courts demand
different due process requirements based upon the so-called type of relief.
The bottom line is that, whether termed “affirmative” or “prohibitive”
relief, a victim protection order is an equitable remedy, and equitable
remedies require personal jurisdiction.303
The distinctions between “affirmative” and “prohibitive” relief most
likely derive from the distinctions some courts have made between
prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. The Tenth Circuit examined these
types of injunctions in O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v.
Ashcroft. 304 The court observed that there are three types of historically
disfavored preliminary injunctions, one of which is “mandatory as opposed
to prohibitory.” 305 The limited purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo. 306 The Tenth Circuit held that disfavored
injunctions, such as mandatory injunctions, are subject to higher scrutiny
because they alter the status quo.307 While this distinction may be pertinent
to a court=s decision-making process for granting or denying an injunction,
this test is irrelevant determining whether jurisdiction exists to grant that
injunction in the first place.
Oklahoma courts have also long recognized the differences between
prohibitive and mandatory injunctions. 308 A mandatory injunction is an
extraordinary remedy that “commands the performance of some positive
act.” 309 The Shah, Spencer, Caplan, and Hemenway courts are mistaken to
2010); Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 937 (N.J. 2005).
300. See Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19.
301. See Caplan, 879 N.W.2d at 125.
302. See id.
303. See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity ' 62 (2008) (“A court cannot exercise its equitable
powers if it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties.”).
304. 389 F.3d 973, 977, aff=d on other grounds, Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418
(2006).
305. Id.
306. See id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)).
307. Id. at 979-80.
308. Dusbabek v. Local Bldg. & Loan Ass=n, 1936 OK 769, & 8, 63 P.2d 756, 759
(“[A]n injunction may be either preventative (prohibitory) to restrain the commission or the
continuance of an act; or mandatory, to require the doing or undoing of an act.”).
309. Dale v. City of Yukon, 1980 OK CIV APP 55, & 9, 618 P.2d 954, 957 (citing Peck

860

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:821

infer that personal jurisdiction is not required if the injunction is
prohibitive. An injunction, whether classified as prohibitive or affirmative,
is still a judgment against the person; therefore, personal jurisdiction is
required to satisfy due process. 310
By misunderstanding the prohibitory-mandatory distinction among
injunctions and mistakenly believing this distinction has jurisdictional
effect, the Shah and Spencer courts indirectly acknowledged that victim
protection orders are injunctions.311 These courts did not misconstrue the
law on status jurisdiction when they arrived at this prohibitive-affirmative
distinction; instead, they misconstrued the jurisdictional requisites for a
court to issue a valid injunction. If victim protection orders are injunctions,
as the Shah and Spencer courts appear to concede, then personal
jurisdiction is required over a nonresident defendant.
Even if these courts correctly found that personal jurisdiction is not
needed for issuing a prohibitive protective order, the benefits of this legal
construct would not be felt in Oklahoma because all victim protection
orders in Oklahoma contain so-called affirmative relief as a matter of
law. 312 When the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided the proper standard of
review for victim protection orders, it warned that “the unwarranted
issuance of a protective order can have unjustified, irreversible
consequences for a defendant.” 313 The court emphasized the fact that,
according to both state and federal law, if one has a victim protection order
issued against him, he cannot possess a firearm. 314 The federal Gun Control
Act provides that anyone against whom a victim protection order has been
issued is precluded from owning, possessing, or transporting a firearm. 315
v. State, 1960 OK 89, & 7, 350 P.2d 948, 950).
310. See Chickasaw Tel. Co. v. Drabek, 1996 OK 76, & 9, 921 P.2d 333, 337. In
Drabek, the court emphasized that “[e]quity follows the law” and due process requires
personal jurisdiction over the parties in an action for an injunction. Id. & 5, 921 P.2d at 335.
The act to be enjoined was the defendant=s interference with the plaintiff=s installation of
cable. See id. && 2-3, 921 P.2d at 334-35. The injunction sought would prohibit the
defendant from interfering with the plaintiff, not compel the defendant to take action. See id.
& 4, 921 P.2d at 335.
311. Contra Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Mass. 2008). The Caplan court
agreed with Bartsch that the issuance of a victim protection order requires status jurisdiction
but that due process limitations barred affirmative relief. Id.
312. See Petition for Protective Order and Petition for Emergency Temporary Protective
Order, supra note 23.
313. Curry v. Streater, 2009 OK 5, & 11, 213 P.3d 550, 555.
314. See id. (citing 21 OKLA. STAT. ' 1290.11(A)(8) (2001 & Supp. 2007) and 18 U.S.C.
' 922(g) (2006)).
315. 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8).
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The federal prohibitions on gun possession are “non-discretionary” and
“not an option that the victim may request. The federal prohibitions are
absolute.” 316 The state law of Oklahoma prohibits a person against whom a
final protection order is entered from getting a concealed weapons license
for three years after the date of the order.317 The state law prohibiting the
possession of a firearm only applies to a final protective order and does not
apply to an ex parte emergency order. 318 The federal law, on the other
hand, does not distinguish between emergency ex parte and final protective
orders; both types of victim protection orders prohibit an abuser from
possessing a firearm. 319
All three of the courts that adopted the middle-of-the road prohibitiveaffirmative approach in determining whether personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is necessary recognized that the surrender of firearms
C whether in accordance with state law or by order of the court C is
affirmative relief, and personal jurisdiction is required to make such an
order. 320 The Gun Control Act makes the surrender of firearms a
mandatory order because it criminalizes possession of firearms by the
abuser after a victim protection order has been issued. 321 Therefore, socalled affirmative relief is always embodied in a victim protection order,
and personal jurisdiction is always required.
Two other problems arise from the reasoning of the prohibitiveaffirmative distinction. Both are a drain on judicial resources. First, judges
hearing requests for victim protection orders have wide discretion in the
relief they can order. 322 This means that a trial judge would have to craft
his or her orders according to whether personal jurisdiction was obtained,
and rule on motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based not
just upon the relief sought by the victim but upon what relief the judge
316. Carbon, supra note 214, at 48.
317. 21 OKLA. STAT. ' 1290.11(A)(8) (2001 & Supp. 2009).
318. See id.; see also 22 OKLA. STAT. '
60.11 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (“[E]ach ex parte or final protective order issued pursuant to
the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act shall have a statement printed in bold-faced type or
in capital letters containing the following information: . . . Possession of a firearm or
ammunition by a defendant while an order is in effect may subject the defendant to
prosecution for a violation of federal law even if the order does not specifically prohibit the
defendant from possession of a firearm or ammunition.”); see Petition for Protective Order
and Petition for Emergency Temporary Protective Order, supra note 23.
319. See 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g) (2006).
320. Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Caplan v. Donovan,
879 N.E.2d 117, 125 (Mass. 2008); Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 140 (N.J. 2005).
321. See 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8) (2006).
322. See 22 OKLA. STAT. ' 60.4(C)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2009).
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might order that is “necessary to bring about the cessation of domestic
abuse against the victim.” 323 Some defendants may consent to the
jurisdiction of the court by appearing. But if a nonresident defendant has
not waived the right to object for lack of personal jurisdiction, he will be
able to challenge jurisdiction of any judgment that says more than “stay
away.” Existing victim protection orders would have to be examined
retrospectively to determine if the nonresident defendant has a basis to
challenge a court=s jurisdiction to issue initial and subsequent orders.
Second, if a court does not have personal jurisdiction when it issues a
judgment against an individual, that order is not valid, and full faith and
credit is not mandated by law. The Uniform Interstate Enforcement of
Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act is not triggered unless the court
has personal jurisdiction, ensuring the validity of the victim protection
order. 324 The court in Shah acknowledged this legal principle when it
observed, “Should a court outside New Jersey having . . . personal
jurisdiction over the plaintiff and defendant . . . issue an order adjudicating
the domestic violence complaint, that order is afforded full faith and
credit.” 325 Judges would have to examine orders from other states for the
presence of affirmative relief, and could only give full faith and credit to
those issued against nonresident defendants over whom the foreign states
had personal jurisdiction.
V. Conclusion
Unfortunately, the reality is that an abusive situation like Sarah and
John=s is not terribly uncommon. Oklahoma has been a state at the
forefront of recognizing the tragedy of domestic violence, creating
awareness among society, and offering victims help. But Oklahoma, strong
in its adherence to constitutional law, cannot sacrifice due process rights
even in the name of something as appalling as domestic abuse C and
Oklahoma need not do so. Oklahoma has recognized that the outer bounds
of due process allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants when their abuse effectively forces their victims into the state.
Language should be added to the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act
clarifying this point. Oklahoma=s shared interest in preventing abuse, when
coupled with acts of abuse committed by the defendant in another state and
323. Id.; see Petition for Protective Order and Petition for Emergency Temporary
Protective Order, supra note 23.
324. See 22 OKLA. STAT. '' 60.23.A., 60.23.D.3 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
325. Shah, 875 A.2d at 942 n.7.
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the establishment of minimum contacts with Oklahoma by directing and
controlling the wife=s relocation to the state, justifiably subjects a
nonresident defendant-abuser to the jurisdiction of the state.
Bevan J. Graybill

